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VOL. 111. 1859, s o .  XI. 
L_ 
L E C T U R E S .  
Friday, Marcli 25tl1, 1859. 
Xajor-General LORD ROKEBY, H.C.B., in thc Chair. 
THE BLILITARY CIIAI2ACTE71 OF TIlJ3 GREAT DUKE OF 
MARLI30XOUGII. 
By Col. NA4CDOUGALL, Commandant Staff College, Sandhurst. 
I n . 1 ~  clioseu as iny subject tlic AIilitary Character of thc grcat Duke 
of ~ I a r l b o r o u ~ l ~ ~  because I ain led to belicvc that his genius is not by any 
iiieans apprcciatcd among his countrymen at its tnic rahic. 
Within tlic Iiuiits of a singIc address, I can only propox to niyself to 
direct your atteiition to a fcw of the enmts of his military career which 
bring out most promiuciitly thedistinctivc clinractcristics of tlic inan t a k a  
;IS a great 1iii1it;u.y coniiuniider. 
But lie w a s  equally great in politics as in war; and, indeed, no nmn can 
bc a great comru:uidcr without the possession of political as wcll as military 
gcnius--mithont that sngacious knoirlcdge of men, personal ascendancy 
over tlicir minds, Cir-reaching vicu-, and unstinted confidence in his own 
powers, which pliiced IInnnibal, Cxsar, Napolcon, Mmlborotigli, and 
Wellington, with x fern others, on it pinnacle apart. 
My object at present is to show tlmt Marlborougll is worthily placed 
amon8 thc great men with whom I h a x  associated him. 
A very brief description of the general statc of affairs in Europe, and of 
the compo~itioii of the  contending parties, at tlic period under consider- 
ation, can hardly bc dispensed with, becmsc a very imperfect idea of 
Narlborough's labours, and of the difficulties he snccessfully surmounted, 
can be acquired from a consideration only of tliosc operntions which were 
tinder his nominal and inimediatc control. 
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258 THE MILITARY CIZARACTER 
In the year 1700, Z n g  Charles 11. of Spain died at RIadrid, having 
bequeathed the \&ole of his vast possessions to a grandson of Louis SIV., 
Philip of Anjou, who then assumed the title of Philip V. of Spain. 
The principal continental poirers acknowledged Philip V., excepting 
Austria. 
The Elector of Bavaria not only acknomledged Philip’s title to tlic 
crown of Spnin, but entered into a cordial alliance with France; and 
being, at the time of the late King of Spain’s death, governor of tlic 
Spanish Xetherlands, the Elector secured for the young French prince the 
possession of that important country and of its numerous fortresses. 
A glance at  the niap will show the commanding position which France 
thus acquired to coerce Europe, and horn hopeless must have appesred at 
first sight the efforts of the coalition formed at a later period to curb the 
ambition of the French monarch,-of which the great Englishman was 
the animating soul, and by whose genius and patient fortitude alone the 
cfforts of that coalition mere brought to a wccessful fcrmination. 
France; Spain; Flanders ; the greater part of Italy, comprising Savoy, 
Nilan, Tuscany, and Kaples; formed one close league in territorial con- 
nection with each other, and mere, for a11 practical purposes, under the 
‘almost absolute direction of Louis XIV.  
Thus Flanders, which had been the barrier of Europe against French 
ambition, became now an outwork of France for aggression against 
Europe. 
In addition to the countries just enumerated, Bavaria formed an ad- 
vanced post of immense advantage to France and danger to Austria, since 
it afforded a secure base from which the armies of Louis might threaten 
Vienna at the distance of only a fern marches. 
In 1701 Austria declared war against France, and sent an army into 
Italy under Prince Eugene, mho at first obtained some success against the 
French forces. 
In 1702 England and Holland joined Austria, and RImlborough, in his 
fifty-third year, mas named Commander-in-Chief of the allied forces in 
Flanders. This appointment, combined with that of Ambassador-Estra- 
ordinary which he had previously held, and in virtue of which he had 
been the principal agent in organising tJe coalition, invested hini with 
the supreme direction of civil and military nE?irs, so far as England jras 
concerned, on the Continent. 
The coalition mas soon joined by many of the lesser German States, at a 
later period by Prussia and Denmark. 
It was easy to foresee that the task of keeping together for any length 
of time R coalition of SO many states, actuated by differing views of their 
individual interests, would be one of no common dificulty. And it may 
be said without exaggeration that their having been kept firm to the 
common cause was due to the personal qualities of 3Iarlborough alone- 
to that ability, subtlety, knowledge of human nature, and personal in- 
fluence due to his remarkable fascination of manner, which, added to his 
unsurpassed miEtary genius, went to make up his grand and powerful 
character. 
Besides the moral difficulties inherent in an alliance of so many states, 
the allies laboured under grave military disadvantages, their territories 
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OF TIIE GREAT DUKE OF IIARLBOROUGE. 259 
being disjointcd, and their several forces having to make long marches 
through neutral or hostilc countries beforc they could unite. To produce 
a decisive effect they must strike at the heart of their enemy's powcr; but 
to reach France they must begin on the Rhine, with Holland as a base, 
and force their way through Flanders and through the barrier of fortresses 
with which the genius of Vauban had encircled tho French frontiers. 
Marlborough on more than one occasion, but particularly after the 
victory of Oudenarde, m u l d ,  if unfettered, have marched on Paris, the 
road to which place seemed to be laid open by that victory. Had he 
done so, the csperience of his irhole military career, during which he 
never suffered a reverse, leads us to believe that he would have been sue- 
cessful ; but lie never could persuade the different members of the coalition 
that such n measure would be anything but the cxtrcme of rashness; and 
cvcn his worthy coadjutor Prince Eugene was startled at the boldness of 
the ides and objected to the risk. 
At the commencement of tho war the opposing forces w r e  thus dis- 
tributed :- 
1. On the extrenie French right Villars commanded an army on the 
Upper Rhine. Opposed to him was Prince Louis of Baden who com- 
mnnded an Austrinn army in the inta-est of the allies. IIis task was to 
maintain the lines of Stolhoffen which guarded one of the principnl defiles 
through the Black Forest, as aell as to defend the other entrances from 
the Rhine through the Black Forest, against the attempts of the French. 
2. Nest, Tallard with a Fre;ch force of 13,000 was posted near 
Ikyserwerth to interrupt the siege of that place, which was to be under- 
taken by n combined Dutch and German force under the Prince of 
Saarbruck. 
3. Next, the principal French army under thc Duke of Burgundy mas 
on the Meuse covering Flanders. To this was opposed the principal 
allied force, at first under the Earl of Athlone, afterwnrds commanded by 
Marlborough in person. 
4. On the extreme French left a French forcc under the Alnrquis dc 
Bedmar was opposcd to the Dutch Gcneral Cohorn. 
6. The Elector of Bavaria in his own country commanded an army in 
the interest of France, which acted as a bridle upon Austria. 
6. In Italy the combined forces of France and Savoy, under the 
nominal command of Victor Amadeus, Duke of Savoy, were opposed to 
an Austrian army commanded by Prince Eugene. 
Marlborough's first difficulty was to overcome the jealousy of Athlone 
ma the Prince 0: Snarbruck at his being appointed to the chief-command; 
and, although their unwilling acquiescence was at length obtained, hc 
found rivals in place of obedient tools in his subordinate generals. By 
Athlone, in particular, he was constantly thwarted under an affectrtion of 
deference; and the remainder, where they did not purposely thwart him 
from jealousy, did so by their extreme caution and timidity. Next  he 
found himself subject to be controlled in all his operations by the Dutch 
field-deputies, kithout whoee consent he could undertake no offensive 
movement, although these men 'Rere, for the most part, entirely ignorant 
of military &airs. Imagine Napoleon controlled by civilian deputies and 
timid or jealous generals. What xrould have become of the Itnlian 
T 2  
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260 TIIE NILITARY CIIARACTEI', 
campaigns, of Xontcnottc, Lodi, Arcola, Rivoli, Marengo ?-what of Ulni 
and ilusterlitz ? But to these trainmcls 'i\Iarlborou~gl~ was subjected 
during thc whole of his command. For n striking illustration of this, I 
refer you to his very first canipaign as related by Cose, the details of which 
I cannot attempt to give in the brief tinie at  niy disposal. You will find 
that imniediately on joining the " m y  in 1702 lie submitted three different 
plans for the consideration of thc Dutch statcs, without diosc concurrence, 
as I have said, nothing could bc undertaken. Althougli evcry moment 
was of value, fourtcen precious days were wasted in dclibcrations. At 
length, when he did obtain permission to adyance, the general in coni- 
mand of the Haanoverkin contingent announced to him that his troops 
could not m o ~ e  without the orders of the IIanom-ian minister at the 
Hague. On reference to that functionary, it was found that among.the 
conditions on mhich he could alone sanction the niarcli of thc Hnnoverians 
was this one, that they should not bc, led across thc Dlcusc. Of this 
IiIarlborougli said, '' I think w e  wcrc nliuost as ivell to be without them 
as agree to it, as if ire haw not tliesc troops ire shall nclt hnvc strength 
to act." 
A reference to the Elector of I€anover had no sooner rcuioved this iliffi- 
cdty, when n similar one arose i~ i t l i  thc Prussian contingent, which had 
to bc disposed of in like inanner by an nppcnl to thc IGng of Prussin. 
In esecntion of the plan ~ ~ h i c h  had been sanctioned by the States, 
Nnrlborough crossed the Meuse below Gravc and advanccd into Bralnnt, 
so as, by tlireatening their conininnic?tions with Ihncc ,  to compel the 
French to  wit1idrcl.w from their forward position bctwecn Goch and 
Gcnnep. 
On the first intelligcnce of this movcment the Frcnch quittcd thcir posi- 
tion, and, making forced marches up the right bank of tlic illeusc, crossed 
that river between Vcnloo and Rurcmonde and struck across country in 
order to regain tlieir communications. 
But on thc 2nd of August ilfarlborough occupied such a position that 
the French must either await Iiis :iilvancc in n camp which was so badly 
chosen that their defeat 1s-ould h a w  been almost certain, or must expose 
their right h n k  to be attacl~ed by him while marching ovcr an open 
heath. 
Thc French quittcd their camp at dusk and, marching :ill night, irerc 
just cntering the heath at  dauii. Marlborough's troops were under arms 
and ready to march; the defeat of the enemy was certain, when the Dutch 
deputies refused their consent to the attack they had sanctioned n few 
hours arIier, and thc French anny acconiplished its flank march within 
sight of the allies,scatlieless, but in such haste and codhion  that the 
deputies confessed n gen t  opportunity of destroying it had been lost 
through their means. 
A very graphic account of this affair is to be found in Gcueral Kane's 
Memoirs, pp. 33 to 35. 
Now let us consider for one moment what would have been the effect 
on the general issuc of thc struggle, if Narlborough's arm,' when raised to 
strike the blow on this occasion for which he had so sliilfully laid his 
plans, had not been held back by civilian deputies. In Indin these gen- 
tlemen are called " political agents." 
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OF THE GREAT DUKE OF BfARLBOl~OUGII. 261 
From what has been said it must appear more than probable, that the 
defeat of the French army undw the Duke of B u r p a y  in 1702 would 
have been not less conipletc than ~vas  that suffered in 1706 by the com- 
bined Freiicli and Bavarians, at  Rarnillies. The nioral effect of such n 
victory at the very cbmniencement of the war, would unquestionably haw 
been greater than was that of the battle of Ramillies, occurring after four 
years of varying success. 
But the effect of Ramillies in 1706, iyas to clear Flanders almost to the 
French frontier; to iiiakc a regular “sauce pipetit” of the French gnrri- 
sons, many of \vhicli surrcndcrcd without n blow, nay, to niakc Louis 
tremble for Paris itself, the road to which capital seemcd to be laid open, 
so much so that Vauban mas ordered to prcpnrc n plan for its defence. 
By tlic first event of the first campaign in 1702, if Marlborough had 
had his own way, the first four ycnrs out of the ten which it lasted would 
have been struck from tlic mar. 
Yet Xarlborougli was assailed by his encmies with tlic slander that lie 
purposely dragged on tlic war from year to year from tlic base motive of 
putting nioncy in his pursc. 
A second opportunity about thrcc mccks after tlic first, and yet a third 
which presented itself on tlic 13th October, of inflicting a disastrous 
defeat on the French army, was lost in n similar nianner tlirougli the in- 
tcrferencc of the Dntcli dcputies. 
Yet although no crushing blow w s  struck during this first campaign 
against the French army in the field, tho capture of Vedoo, Rurcmonde, 
Stevensmart, Macstriclit; and LiEge, all on the PIIcusc, and all effected 
between tlic 18tli September :ind thc 23rd October, gnvc to the allies 
comniand of tlie navigatiou of that important rivcr, and n secure base from 
idiicli to operate in tlic ncxt campaign against thc right flank of the 
general front of the enemy; at  the sanic time that it attested the activity of 
the English comniandcr and tlic surprising rcsources of his genius, Ivhich 
could effect sue11 results not~~ithstanding tlie fetters in d i i ch  it was coni- 
pclled to work. 
In other quarters wv11crc ~hrlboimigh did not command, that is, in Italy 
and Germany, thc coalition met with reverses. 
Early in 1703 Portuigal joined tlic confederacy; and although this 
accession was of great value sincc it cxposed thc weakest part of the 
Spanish frontier to an attack by land, it added greatly to the difliculties 
and labours of tlie British gomniandcr. 
At the time wvlim his own plans in the R’ethcrlands occupied so much 
of his attention, and their csecution rcquired thc employment of n forcc 
xyhicli he liad the utmost difficulty in providing, hc mas charged with the 
tlianklcss task of ciidezvouring to obtain, for servicc in Portugal, troops 
from tlie Dutch, the emperor, and thc Gcrman States, all unwilling qnrties, 
\rho could not be persuaded that their individual interests could be in any 
~ ~ a y  advanced by sending a singlc soldier nwny from thc protection of 
tlieir own frontiers. Itlarlborougli was finally obliged to sl1pply n consi- 
dcrablc detaclinient from tlic forcc in the Nctlierlands to complcte the 
Portuguese expedition; and hc was liarasscd by endless importunities in 
his choice of generals and oficers for that cspedition, as IVCU as by the 
captions spirit of the Portnguesc court. 
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262 TEE JIILITAET CXAILiCTER 
During the campaign of 1703 in the Netherlands, BIarlborough’s plans, 
always conceived on a scale which the n ~ d s  of his coadjutors wcre unable 
to appreciate-and particularly one grand schcine for forcing the Frcncll 
lines, and the capture of Ant ic rp  and Ostcnd-were thwarted by the mis- 
conduct of some of the Dutch generals, by the interference of the dcputics, 
and by tlic virulence of the factions at tlie Hague. The war, rcduced to 
one of sieges, yias marked this year only by the capture of Bonn, Slugs, 
and Limburg. 
On tlie part of the French, the campaign of 1703 had been originally 
planned by the court of Versaillcs on a scale worthy of the “Grand 
&Ionarque,” and of the vast resources which he directed with absolute 
authority. 
While Villeroi engaged the wholc attention of Marlborough in Flanders, 
a great combined effort sins to be made in Germany against Vienna. For 
this purpose Narshal Villars was directed to march with the army of the 
Upper Rhine through the defiles of tho Black Forest in one direction, 
~vhile from another quarter the French army of Italy, leaving n small 
force to observe the Austrians in Lombardy, was to enter Gerninny 
through the defiles of the Tyrol; and thcsc forces, after uniting with the 
army of the Elector of Bzvaria, were then to pour in one resistless torrent 
on Vienna. 
Accordingly Villars, having secured a passage over the Rhiue by the 
capture of Kehl, led his army through the Blaclc Forest and \\-as joined 
a t  Duttlingen by the Elector of Bavaria, who returned westward for that 
purposc after having defeatcd and driven the Austrian troops beyolid thc 
Inn and the Danube, and reduced Neuburg and Ratisbon on the lattcr river. 
After this junction it was agreed that Vilhrs should observe the Imp- 
rialists on the Danube; while the Elector wit11 15,000 men should invade 
the Tyrol, to open the passcs by which the French army of Italy under 
Vendome must march to join him. But the sturdy resistance of the 
Tyrolese peasantry saved the empire. Vendome, coming from Italy, 
could not penetrate beyond Trent; vhile thc Elector, coming from Ger- 
many, was defeated in endeavouring to force the pass of the Urenner and 
driven out of the Qrol with considcrablo loss. 
This miscarriage, joined to the defection of the Duke of Savoy from the 
French interest, necessarily deferred the grand effort against Austria to 
the succeeding year. 
We are now brought down to the year 17Q4, that of the ever famous 
and admirable campaign of Blenheim, which would itself, even though it 
liad been his only one, have established the right of 3Iarlborougli to be 
classed among the military Titans of the human race. 
The plan above described became known to the English general through 
his spies. He  perceived that the enterprise, if successful, would trample 
Austria in the dust and shatter the confedcracy to pieces. 
I t  is indeed difficult to conceive z more gloomy Drospect than that mith 
which the year 1704 opcncd on Xarlborough, who alone with Prince 
Eugene appreciated the magnitude of the crisis. 
Austria was in imminent danger. With a forlllidable insurrection ex- 
isting in Hungary in the rcar, where the rebels had gained considerable 
successes against the imperialist troops-threatened at the same time with 
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OF TIIE GREAT DUKE OF XARLBOROUGH. 263 
an overwhelming irruption of enemies in front-the defensive system of 
Austria was in a deplorable condition. 
Every exertion had been made to raisc lcvies and prepare Vienna for a 
siege; but \-Ah au impoverished country and an exhausted treasury 
crery exertion was fruitless. 
The Elector of Bavaria commanded the Danube from its source to the 
frontier of Austria. IIc occupied Ulm, Neuburg, Ratisbon, Passau, and 
Lintz, all on that river. His force was raised by the junction with Villars 
to 45,000 men, and it was to be feared that Narshal ‘l’allard-whose army 
on the Upper Rhinc had likewise been raised to 45,000 men, and idlo had 
lately reduced Landau and Old Brisach, which last gave him x passage 
over the Rhine-would march to join the Elector through the southern 
pnsses of the Black Forest, which mere weakly guarded by twelve Dutch 
battalions stationed at Rothweil, aided by some militia and y m n t r y .  
The force which the Emperor could oppose to the Llcctor barely 
amounted to 20,000 men, while the main army of the empire under Prince 
Louis of Baden guarded the lines of Stollhoffcn, near Carlsr~~lie, xhich 
had been constructed to defend the entrance to the northern defiles of the 
Black Forest. 
Besides these, a few scattered battalions of Hessians and Prussians were 
in the neighbourhood of Plaipsbourg. It seemed scarccly possible to 
prevent Tallnrd from joining the Elector in Bavaria, and from operating 
on Vienna x i th  90,000 men. 
i\krlborongh saw clearly that the Cite of the confederacy must be 
decided in Germany; he therefore formed the bold design of entrusting 
the protection of Holland nnd of his conquests in Flanders to the Dutch 
alone, and, leaving in his rear the numerous fortresses and armies of the 
cneniy, of hastening with every man, horse, and gun he could colIect to the 
decisive point. His plan was to transport his army by forced marches 
from the Netherlands into Bavaria, and there-having united with Eugene, 
and having gathered up in his advance all the small detachmcnts of the 
confcderates-to overwhelm the Elector of Bavaria before he could be 
reinforced by Tallard’s army from the Rhino. 
But botli the moral and physical difficulties to be surmounted in the 
csecution of this scheme were of so grave a nature, that any mind but 
one cast in the very grandest mould, would have shrunk appalled froin 
the prospect they presented. His first care must be to bafne the penetra- 
tion alike of friends nnd enemies, as both were ahlost equally dangerous 
to the success of his project. 
For his enemies, had they learned his intention, might easily have 
frustrated it by a vigorous effort. He must give the slip to Villeroi in 
the Netherlands, and to Tnllard on the Rhine, the latter of whom,would 
have intercepted his march, and the former would have hung on his skirts, 
had they been amnre of his destination, while the consent of the Dutch as 
well as of his own government would certainly have been withheld, had 
their timidity been startled by the disclosure at once of the whole of his 
intended enterprise; he must therefore lead them on by degrees, and 
deceive them into a concurrence with his first measures, until they should 
find themseIves too fm committed to recede. 
The first condition of success thercfore was absolute secrecy ns to his 
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264 TIIC XiLITARY CIIAIII:ACTEI1 
real plan, which was sliarcd between himself and Prince Eugene alone. Ire 
persuaded the English government to forward his views m5thout disclosing 
their extent, to send 10,000 additional troops to the Xetherlands, and to give 
subsidies to Portugal and Savoy, to enable thcni to maintain the struggle. 
Ilc repaired to the IIague, 
where he laid bcforc the go:o.vernment a plan skilfully calculated at once to 
conceal and to promote his design, of taking tlic offensive vigorously 
on the i\Iosclle with his own army, ivhilc the Dutch, under Overkirk, 
remained on the defensiw in the Netherlands. 
The consent of the States even to this plan mas only extorted at length 
by Narlborough's declaring it to be his fLned resolve to carry off the 
Englisli force to the i~Ioscllc without the Dutch ausiliaries, if they pcr- 
sisted in their refusal. Nest he had to persuade them to furnish n sum of 
money to enable the BIargriivc of Baden to keep the field. 
He next had to deal witli the King of Prussia, a most exacting and 
troublesome ally. i\ZnrIborougll flattered this prince so adroitly by nffcct- 
ing to make him a confidential communication of his plans, even to thc 
length of specifying tlie intended disposition of liis troops on the 1\Zosclle, 
and by addressing him as the dcliwxer of the cmpirc; that hc obtained 
from Liin a considerablc increase of the Prussian contingent. 
By these efforts he succeeded in raising the ariny which Prince 
Louis of Bnden commanded a t  StollhoRcn to 30,000 men, and, having 
also provided for tlic defence of his conquests in the Netherlands, 
on tlic 19th of Xny 1 1 ~  commcnced liis memoral~lc march towards the 
Nosellc. At liis very first Iialting-place, on tlic 20th, he received expresses 
from Overkirk in one direction, and from Prince Imiis at Stollhoffen in 
another. Overkirk begged him to halt because Villeroi had made a 
forward tlireateninm movcnient. Princc Louis urged his joining hina at 
f3tollhoffen becausc4l'ollard threatened to cross the Rhine. 
To satisfy Overkirk Jic lidted for one day, while, to reassure Prince 
Louis, he directed the Prilssian troops on the Rhine to move towards 
Pliilipsbourg as if to reinforce him, hut with secret orders not to proceed 
beyond a certain distance. 
Ou tlic 23rd at Bonn he had thc vexation to learn that Tallard, having 
crossed tlic Ithinc at Brisach, had succeeded in pushing n reinforcement of 
10,000 men through tlie Black Forest to the Elector of Bavaria, and had 
then taken post near Strasbourg. IIe heard also that Villeroi from the 
BIcnsc was hastening nfter him to the l\Ioscllc. 
ITaving crossed tlic Rhinc at Coblcntz, lie reached Xcntz on the 29th. 
IIc hcrc disclosed his design to the Prince of IIessc, and persuaded him to 
send the battering-train lie lind collected at AIentz for the expected opera- 
tions on the Xosellc up the Rhine to Nandicim, as if now for the purpose 
of besieging Landau. 
IHthcrto his movements had held Europe in expectation, suspended t l ~ c  
operations of the Elector of Bavaria, and perplesed tlic Frencli com- 
manders. Iris advance beyond tlie Moselle seemed to threaten the invasion 
of Alsacc, wvhile the despatch of the Hcssian battering-train to AIannhein1 
would appear to indicate the siege of Landau. 
Villeroi, coming from the Meusc, nccordiagly directed his mnrcli tomnrds 
&andnu, and TaUard moved northnard to join him. 
With tlic Dutch lie had more diEculty. 
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Having thus set these two dangerous opponents on a wrong scent and 
secured a considerable start, the army which Prince Louis liad commanded 
T ~ M  left to watch then1 on the Rhinc under the command of Princc Eugene, 
to prevent them, if possible, from crossing that rivcr and reinforcing the 
Elector of Bavaria. 
Marlborough mas very ansious to liavc Eugene as his immediate col- 
le‘agnc on the Danube; but the Princc of Baden, insisting on his superior 
rank, was transferred to what he considered tlic more important command, 
and it mas with difficultyhc could be brought to consent to share the chief 
coininand with the English general. It was finally settled that they should 
cserciae the command on altcrnatc days ; thus Unrlborougli found himself 
saddled with a captious and incnpnblc colleague. 
Proceeding onwards from IIentz, Jlarlborougli crossed the Keckar twice 
at Ladcnburg and Lanffen, on the 3rd and 9th of June. 
He had no sooner done so than his dcsign burst at once 011 the minds of 
his astonished enemies. 
On tlic 21st his .whole army cleared tlic defile of Gcislingen, and on tlic 
22nd united with the 20,000 nien whom Eugene had prcviously corn- 
mandcd. 
On the 24th tlic Allies ndvnnecd to Langen:iu and Elchingen. The 
Elector of Bavaria, who was at Ulm, withdrew to his cntrenclied camp at 
Dillingen. Narlborougli’s object being to strike at Envaria, and by wasting 
his country to compel thc Elcctor to abandon the French alliance. 
On tlic 1st July tlic Allies passed within sight of the Electoral camp, 
and halted that night a t  a distance of fourteen miles from Donnun-erth. 
This place was defended by 12,500 Bavarians who occupied the com- 
manding heights of the Sclielleiibcrg, wliere they laboured night and day 
to strengthen the entrenclimcnts. 
On the 2nd it  wws Marlborough’s turn to conininad. IIe was resolvcd 
to gain Donauwcrth at any price as n place of arms for his intended inva- 
sion of Bnvnrin, and lie dctcrrnined to attack the Scl~ellenberg that very 
day, notwithstanding that tlic intervening roads mcrc heavy with continued 
rains and the a m y  w s  encumbered with a long train of artillery, becausc 
hc felt sure that if lie failcd to do so on the 2x14 the 3rd 1.ouk1 be wasted 
by Prince Louis in irresolution, and that the delay of twcnty-four hours 
would cnablc thc enemy to complete his works and to receive rcinforcc- 
ments, in wliicli case he said tliat the delay of every Iiour rrouild cost the 
loss of 1,000 additional men in the assault. 
Althougli nnablc to bring up his men till 4 P.M. 
lie assaulted Schcllenberg at tliat late hour, carried it after a dcspcrate 
conflict, in mliich 8 generals, 11 coIoncIs, and 1,500 of other ranks mere 
killed, and 4,000 mounded. 
Tho Elector, who crossed the Danube a t  Dilljngen and marched by the 
south bank to tlic relief of his garrison, was only in  time to witness their 
defeat, and mithdrew to Augsburg, leaving 1Js dominions at the mercy of 
his enemies. 
On the 10th of July the allies, having crosscd the Lccli at Gunder- 
kingen, entered Bavaria. 
On the 18th the army occupied Aiclia, but Narlborough’s design of 
besieging 3Innich mas prcyentcd by the f i l u re  of Prince Louis to providc 
The rcsult is kno\m. 
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [E
CU
 L
ibr
ari
es
] a
t 1
9:2
3 2
1 A
pr
il 2
01
5 
266 THE JIILITARY CIXAEACTER 
a battering-train as he hsd proniised to do. 3,000 c a d r y  were, however, 
sent on to burn and destroy to the very gates of the capital; a barbarous 
proceeding, adopted for the purpose of forcing the Elector to make terms. 
Ncanivhile Tallard had crosscd thc Rhino with 35,000 men, and, 
eluding Eugene, joined the Elector of Bavaria on the 5th August. 
Eugene, marching from the Rhine in n pnrallel direction, arrived at 
IIochstett a t  the same time with 18,000 men, having left 12,000 to watch 
Villcroi. 
Prince Louis of Baden was now persuaded to undertake the siege of 
Ingolstadt, and x i s  detached on that service with 20,000 men. 
There iras now a danger lest the enemy, being wry superior in force to 
either RIarlborough or Eugene singly, might bent thcm in detail. 
On 9th August, it being ascertained that the Elector and Tal lad  were 
in full march from Augsburg to Dillingcn, in the evident design of there 
crossing the Danube and overwhelming Eugene’s 18,000 men at Hoclistett, 
arrangements were madc for a concentration in front of Donautrerth. 
Eugene’s army fell back behind tho Kesscl river, where it was joined by 
that of Marlborough on the night of the 11th. 
On the 13th Akrlborough and Eugene attacked and defeated the Elector 
and Tallard at Blenlieim, and thus terminated this brilliant campaign, 
which appears to me to be one of the very grandest military achieve- 
ments on record. 
KO similar instance exists in history of a mere general, ansmrable to 
his own sovcrcign and to his allies, taking on himself such nn immense 
responsibility. Alexander and Napoleon, for the prosecution of their 
great projects, wielded absolute power. IIannibal, though opposed by a 
faction at Carthage, was absolute in Italy. But what Xarlborough did 
was in direct contravention of the authority under which he acted; and it 
was only in conquering their enemies that he conquered the approval of 
his employers. 
Historians relate with wonder how Napoleon, on the 1st September, 
broke up his camp on the hpights of Boulogne, set in motion eight corps 
by various routes to the Danube, and terminated a campaign of one 
liundred days with the crowning victory of Austerlitz. 
Napoleon’s march was of his own troops, whom n nod from hini 
sufficed to move. That of 3Iarlborough was the march of allies tricked 
by degrees into carrying out a plan with the secret of which they were 
not entrusted, coming from various quarters, with orders from different 
sovereigns; the command divided on altcrnate days with an incapable 
colleague; nnd yet, in the course of less than n hundred days, i\Iarlborougll, 
too, l i d  transported the confcderatc troops from the RIeusc to the Danube, 
routed the allied French and Bavarians at Blcnheim with the loss of 
40,000 men, conquered Bkvaria, dcrthroncd the Elector, and saved the 
empire from destruction. 
In making war there is one great principlc or rule, nnd only one, whicli 
is of nniveraal and arbitrary application, viz. that you must be superior 
in force to your enemy a t  the decisivc point and time; or, mhere actual 
circumstances render * that an impossibility, then it is required to bring 
up to the dccisivc point evcry man, horse, and gun that can by any 
possible foiesight and combination be arraycd there. 
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Other rulcs there are with respect to the manner of applying the firat, 
having rcferencc to the preservation of your own communications, and to 
tile intercepting those of your enemy, besides many masims which fire 
all subject to modXcation by actual circumstances, and particulnrly by 
moral considerations. 
But the genius of a great captain is a law to itself. IIe takes counsel 
of his own inspiration alone, and, unfettered by arbitrary ndes, he keeps 
his eye fixed on the object of all operations-success-and preases on to 
the god, sensible that no course of action can be at variance with military 
principh which lcad him to it. 
Narlborough’s comprehensive view embraced Europe as one vast battle- 
field, of which he saw that Bavaria was the decisive point; casting offal1 
commuhication with his base, like Hannibal in his invasion of Italy, he 
t.hrew himself into the midst of enemies, relying on his o m  genius to 
organise h secure base of operations in a -hostile country; and this he 
nccomplished. 
His military genius was peculiarly that of n strategist in the literal 
weaning of the term; and he employed on the contracted theatre of n 
field of battle precisely the same weapons of finesse, masterly combi- 
nation and s~ilful execution, which win our admiration in his great stra- 
tegical operations. 
He appeared to den1 yith the minds of his opponents at  will-to com- 
mand them to believe what he desired them. to believe-and having, by 
the snbtlety of his art, led them to weaken the point which he perceived 
by intuition to be the decisive point of the field, he then directed his 
battalions and squadrons on that point with irresistible force and ability. 
At Blenheim, by a feigned attack on the village of that name, Mnrl- 
borough induced Tallard to draw nearly the whole of his infantry from 
the centre, nnd to shut i t  UP uselessly in the village, so that the attack 
which Marlborough prepared against the centre was successful and 
decisive. 
He was not content with mere victory; his measures were nlways taken 
with a view to inflict the greatest loss possible on his opponents. At 
Blenheim, by breaking the centre, he cut off nearly the whole of Tallard’s 
right wing from the only road by which it could retreat. 11,000 pri- 
soners mere taken in Blenheim alone; Tallard himself was captured, Rnd 
the total loss sustained by the French and Bavarians in the battle and 
subsequent retreat, is cornputcd at  40,000 men and 47 guns; a loss greater 
than any which France ever afier sustained until TVaterloo. 
At Ramillies the Tonib of Ottomond on the French right was the point 
which Marlborough’s eye marked as decisive. To induce Villeroi to 
aeaken that point he ordered a feigned attack on the French left. A 
marshy stream, difficult to cross, separated the French left from Marl- 
borough’s right which mas posted on high ground that sloped both ways, 
tiz., down to the stream in his front as well as to the rear of his line. 
Marlborough’s infantry of the right wing in two lines, supported by 
cavalry, marched down the slope towards the stream u if about to cross. 
Villeroi, alarmed for his left, reinforced it by a considerable body of 
infantry from his right. Marlborough waited till the enemy’s movement 
was marly completed, and thcn ordered his right to retire to the elevation 
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it  had pitted. With his first line he Iialtcd on the crest and ~IloTved 
front to tlic cneniy, but hc carried his second line ovcr the height to the 
rear, and moved it rapidly, concealed by the nature of the ground, to 
left. IIe thus strengthened his attacking forcc a t  the same time that 
he induced Villeroi to weaken the point lic was about to attack; and the 
victory was principally owing to this circumstance. 
The time d l  only admit of my directing your attention to one other 
operation, which is a wonderful instance of the power which the English 
general wielded over the minds of his opponents. I allude to the passage 
of the French lines of Bonchain in 1711. The details \ d l  be fomd n d l  
related in Cose. 
Xarlhorough selected as the point where the passagc of the lines might 
be most easily effected, cne which was defended by an important fortified 
post named Arleus, on Marlborough’s side of the lines. This post was 
held by the French, and lie tlierefore resolved to take it j but for tlie sue- 
cess of his general plan it r a s  not enough that hc should cnpturc this fort, 
because if hc should do so, and citlicr retain it or demolish it himself, the 
attention of Villars the French general would be drawn to the point, and 
he might so guard this part of tho lines, ivliicli mas very strong, tIiat suc- 
cess by main forcc moiild bc hopeless. 
~Iarlborougli must if possiblc not only divert the attention of Villars 
from tlic ncighbourhood of Arleus, but he must induce that marshal to 
demolisli the dcfences of tlic post himsclf. To effect this, which sccnied 
difficult cnoiigh, the duke had rccoursc to tlic following masterly stratagem. 
IIc assaulted :ind took Arlcltp, to slioiv Villars 110 could capture it wvlicn 
lie pleascd; lie then considerably enlarged and strcngthencd its works to 
delude Villnrs into the belief that he valued it as n defensive post. 
Having so donc IN left Arleus and its garrison to its fate, and carried 
Iiis army to a distant pnrt of the lincs which he ostentatiously threatcncd 
to  attack, feeling coifident that Villars would then rctakc Arlcux, and, 
finding it on account of its increased extent to require n larger garrison 
than hc could safely spare from thc defence of that portion of the lincs 
menaced by llarlborough, tliat tlic French marshal w~oidd then dcmolisIi 
a post which his adversary seemed to value. 
ArIeuv was 
attacked and captured by the l~rencli, with its mliolc garrison. Villars 
was greatIy cIated, wliilc ‘thc English general prctended the dccpest morti- 
fication. He shut liinisclf up in liis tent, with esquisite dissimulation 
change$ liis usual courtcous demeanour and bccamc morose, and declarcd 
to all ~ h o  had access to him that Iic ~vould repair the disgrace he had 
sustnincd in tlic loss of Arleus, by attacking the enemy’s entrenchments 
in his front at all hazal.(ls. 
IIc soon Iind tlic satisfaction of learning that Villars had evacuated 
Arlens and dcniolisIied its dcfcnccs,’ and, leaving that portiou of the lines 
destitntc of troops, that hc had conccntratcd liis whole forcc bcliind the 
pnrt nicnnced by 3Iarlb0roug11. 
To confirm Villnrs in liis error, Nnrlborough, nttcndcrl by his geiernls, 
madc an claborntc rcconnnissnncc of tlic enemy’s position in f d  vien- of 
thc French army. IIc rode along tlic front within cannon shot; stopping 
occasion all^-, and pointing to differcnt parts of the cntrenclirncnts, be cnre- 
It Iiappcncd according to i\Iarlborougl~’s cdculations. 
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fully csplained to his generals tlic dircctioii their scvcral columns slionld 
take in adrancing to the attack. 
Having thus coniplctcly deceived both friends and foes, and effectually 
prcvented the possibility of his real design being communicated to Villars 
by confiding it to no one, lie g p ~ - ~  orders for the troops to form for the 
assault of the lines at tattoo that evening, and intimated to the oficers in 
comniand of the separate columns that t h ~ y  mrc  only to move off under 
the guidance of staff oficers ~ 1 1 0  lvould bc sent for that purposk?. 
The army was formed accordingly a t  tattoo beating in columns of 
attmk; but, instcad of advancing, they filed off to the left, tlie attention of 
the French general bting occupied by a demonstration made by the light 
c a d r y  in front of his left. 
Marching all night, AIarlborougli, at  eleven o’clock on the follov&q 
morning, passed the lines unopposcd near the ruined fort of Arleux with a 
considerable body of cavdry and infmtry. 
&fore dark the same evening his whole nrniy occupied a strong defensive 
position on the French side of tlic lines; and this celebrated barrier, i&ch 
Villars in writing to his sovereign had cnllcd the 6‘ nc plus ultra” of the 
English general, \\-as broken through u-ithout the loss of a man. 
Like niost great generals i\Iarlborough invariably took the initiative, 
and compelled his adversary to follow it, and no coniniancler lins ever 
been more enterprising. 
His cnre in pro\-iding for the comfort of his troops was uiiccasing, and 
he was, in the words of Mother Ross, a fhmous canip folloier, whose 
advcnturcs m r e  mittcn by Defoc under the name of Mrs, Christian Dai-ies, 
entirely beloved by all thc forces, not only for his courage and conduct, 
bKIt equally dear to us all for his afEtbility and humanity.” 
In estimating the grcatncss of iUarlborough, TVC ought to take into 
account the age at which lie first cornmandcd an army in the field and his 
physical infirmities. 
It is strange to obsci7-c how late in life the grcat work for which they 
have been born comes to some men. 
If Wellington had died at thirty-four lie would still have left a 1:istiiig iiamc 
in the history of British India. At  forty-five he had swept eight French 
marshals out of Spain, and brokcn the last hope of Napoleon nt Waterloo; 
but if fihrlborougli had died a t  fifty, he would scarcely haw. furnisliccl n 
paragraph for the inost voluminous history that evcr mas written. His 
great deeds ~vcre done, his great name earned, when falling into the sere 
and yclloiv leaf; when his strong frame mas beginning to fail; when, as 
he himself writes, “My eyes :ire so bad I do not see what I do ;’ and whcn 
(‘ I am habitually mad with headache.” In another place he p-p, (I  ‘am 
troubled with cold fits of ague, and with gout,“ And again, “ I  have 
become so lean, that, if not well nursed in the winter, I shall certainly be 
in a consumption.” 
Yet, with these ailments, he contrivcd to be seventeen hours on horse- 
back at n time ~vlicn, lie mites, “ If I were in London I should be in bed 
in n high fever.” 
Then we see him at the age of fifty-eight at the siege of Lille, doing the 
double duty of commanding Eugene’s army as I\-ell as his own, and before 
Ghent in a Flemish fog at Christmas, paddling in the s e t  trenches, and 
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earning so great a cold that he says, cg It is very distressing to nie to hold 
down my head.” 
Al l  this and moreover at the same time to manage Dutch, Prussians, 
jealous subordinates, political agents, kings, queens, and ernpcrors, English 
Whigs and English Tories, and, hardest task of all perhaps, tho Duchcss 
of Marlborough, was, it will be admitted, no child’s play. 
To sum up his military achievements; in twenty cnmp aims-ten .P of 
which were successivc-he passed all tlic rivers and b e s  ho attemptcd, 
took every town he invested, won dl the battles he fought, and was nerer 
surprised by the enemy. 
Cam- 
paign.” The particular lines were inspired by Marlborough‘s personal 
clcmeanoiu. at Blenheim. 
I mayfitlyconolude with R quotation from Addison’s poem, ‘( 
‘T\vas then great &farlborough’s mighty soul was proved, 
That, in the shock of charging hosts unmoved, 
Amidst confusion, terror, nnd despair, 
Examined all the dreadful scenes nf war. 
In peaceful thought the field of death surverecl, 
To hinting squadrons sent the timely aid, 
Inepircd rcpuked battalions to engage, 
And taught the doubtful battle =here to rage. 
So xslien soma angel by Divine command 
With rising tempests shakes a guilty land, 
Such as of late o‘er p d e  Britannia passed. 
Cnlm and unniorcd he drive8 the furious blast, 
.4nd, ?1CaECd the Almfglity’a orden to pcrform, 
Rides in tho whirlwind and directs the storm. 
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